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I. Introduction 
Division I football is a popular and profitable business in which the sixty-five universities 
that comprise the Power Five Conferences (plus Notre Dame) generated $6.3 billion in revenue 
during 2014-15.1  This extremely large amount of revenue would surely not be generated if it 
were not for the players providing the athletic service of performing on the field.  Are these 
players primarily students that are voluntarily offering these services usually in exchange for a 
free education?  Or are they primarily employees performing said services for their employer and 
also gaining an education at the same time? 
A number of players from Northwestern University believe that they are the latter and 
that they should be considered employees of the University.2  These players brought a challenge 
rooted in this belief before the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”).3  This 
article examines that challenge, the ruling of both the regional and federal Boards, and another 
recent decision by the NLRB, Columbia.4  Columbia consisted of a similar employee-status-
seeking challenge but involved collegiate teaching and research assistants rather than athletes.5  
This article will lay out the Northwestern challenge, the Columbia challenge, how they relate to 
one another, how Columbia can possibly aid the Northwestern situation, and what is likely to 
come of this topic in the future.  This article notes that the employee-seeking challenge for 
                                                          
*J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2018; B.A. Psychology and Political Science, University of 
Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2015.  Jared currently serves as a research staff writer for the DePaul Sports Law 
Journal, and will serve as the Editor-in-Chief during the 2017-18 academic year. Jared would like to sincerely thank 
his mentor and the former editor-in-chief, Erica Boos, for her guidance in the creation of this publication. 
1 Jon Solomon, Inside College Sports: SEC, Big Ten dominate $100M revenue club, CBS Sports, 
http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/inside-college-sports-sec-big-ten-dominate-100m-revenue-club/ 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017).  The “Power Five” conferences are the Big 10 conference, the Big 12 conference, the 
Pac-12 conference, the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), and the Southeastern Conference (SEC). 
2 Post-Hearing Brief of Petitioner College Athletes Players Association, 2014 WL 1922054 (N.L.R.B.). 
3 Id. 
4 The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York and Graduate Workers of Columbia-GWC, UAW, 
364 NLRB No. 90 (2016). 
5 Id. 
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collegiate athletes is currently at a stalemate, and it is predicted that any progress that may occur 
in the future will likely come from the individual states. 
II. Original Challenge 
Approximately eighty-five Northwestern University football players on athletic 
scholarship (the “Players”) attempted to obtain representation by a labor organization—the 
College Athletes Players Association (“CAPA”)—so they could collectively bargain the terms 
and conditions of what would be their employment.6  This attempt involved an area that the 
NLRB has never considered: Division I Football.7  According to the challengers however, the 
issue involves questions that have been considered and decided by the Board previously.8  Per 
the evidentiary record, the Players claimed that they were employees within the meaning of 
Section 2(3) of the NLRA, that CAPA was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 
2(5), and that CAPA seeks to represent an appropriate unit.9  In opposition, Northwestern 
University argued that Brown University10, another NLRB decision, barred the Players’ attempt 
to organize, and in addition, claimed that their challenge violated public policy.11  The decision 
of whether these Players were able to organize and collectively bargain turned on whether they 
were in fact considered “employees”.12  After analyzing the Players’ duties, the benefits 
Northwestern receives from the Players’ services, and the Players’ compensation, the Regional 
NLRB determined that the Northwestern Players were in fact “employees.” 13 
 
                                                          
6 Post-Hearing Brief of Petitioner College Athletes Players Association, 2014 WL 1922054 at 2.  
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id.; See also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3), (5).  
10 Brown University and Int’l Union et al., 342 NLRB No. 42 (2004)). 
11 Post-Hearing Brief of Petitioner College Athletes Players Association, 2014 WL 1922054 at 3.  
12 Id. at 16-17 (citing NLRB v. Town & Country, Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995) (“the ordinary dictionary definition of 
‘employee’ is any ‘person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation’”)).  
13 Id. at 34. 
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A. The Players’ Duties 
According to the Players, football has been called a “year-round gig” at Northwestern, as 
players have “extensive mandatory football-related duties that they perform throughout the year, 
under the comprehensive control of the coaches.”14  Starting with Training Camp and finishing 
with Summer Workouts, the Players invest approximately twenty to thirty hours per week in 
football-related activities.15  Northwestern’s own football coach, Patrick Fitzgerald, has been 
quoted saying that his Players’ football responsibilities are viewed as a “full-time job.”16  Former 
player Kain Colter testified in detail regarding a Northwestern player’s football-related 
activities.17  He explained that these activities could be divided into eight periods.18  These 
periods are as follows: 
i. Training Camp 
Players are required to report to training camp in early August, during which time Colter 
explained “it’s football every day.”19  The Players participate in activities each day based on the 
schedules prepared by the coaching staff, from early in the morning to late in the evening.20  If 
the Players fail to participate in said activities, they are subject to discipline by the coaching 
staff.21  A typical day during training camp lasts about fourteen hours, totaling about fifty to sixty 
hours per week of football-related activities.22 
 
 
                                                          
14 Id. at 4. 
15 Id. at 5-12. 
16 Id. at 12 
17 Id. at 5.  
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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ii. Regular Season 
Lasting from September through November/early December, the Players devote over 
forty hours per week to football-related activities, including work-outs, practices, and games. 23  
They are once again provided a detailed schedule of required activities prepared by the 
coaches.24  In addition to the requirement of performance during games on Saturdays, the Players 
are also required to handle media obligations, adhere to a dress code, and participate in team 
activities (such as watching film and strength training).25 
iii. Post Season 
If the team qualifies for a post-season bowl game, the Players experience an extended 
season, with the hours devoted to football-related activities per week similar to that of the 
Regular Season.26  The Players are limited in any vacation they may take to see their families due 
to the football related conflict, but when they can travel, they must get their travel plans 
approved by the coaching staff.27 
iv. Winter Workouts 
This period begins in mid-January, normally about two weeks after the post-season ends, 
and continues until around mid-February.28  During this period, Players participate in 
approximately twelve to fifteen hours per week of football-related activities, including strength 
and conditioning training.29 
 
 
                                                          
23 Id. at 9. 
24 Id. at 6.  
25 Id. at 6-7.  
26 Id. at 9. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 10. 
29 Id. 
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v. “Winning Edge” 
After the Winter Workouts, the Players partake in one week of “Winning Edge.”30  
During this period, the Players engage in intense workouts dictated by the coaches.31  “Winning 
Edge” is conducted to prepare the Players to “transition” into football.32  This week requires the 
Players to sacrifice about fifteen to twenty hours of time.33 
vi. Spring Football 
Beginning after “Winning Edge” and continuing until mid-April, the Players participate 
in football activities for six days a week, totaling twenty to twenty-five hours per week.34  These 
activities consist of practices, meetings with the coaching staff, and weightlifting and 
conditioning.35 
vii. Spring Workouts 
Similar to Winter Workouts, Spring Workouts require players to devote twelve to fifteen 
hours per week and runs from about one week after Spring Football ends and continues through 
May.36 
viii. Summer Workouts 
After Spring Workouts, the Players are allowed about one to two weeks of vacation, but 
then must report back to campus for Summer Workouts, which consist of twenty to twenty-five 
hours per week of football-related activities.37  If a Player is taking a summer class or has a 
                                                          
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 11.  
37 Id. 
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summer internship that conflicts with the Summer Workouts, he must report early at 5:30 am to 
do his assigned workouts.38 
B. The Benefits Northwestern Receives from Players’ Services 
Being a team in one of the Power Five conferences (the Big Ten), Northwestern 
generates significant revenue from its football team.39  Between 2003 and 2012, Northwestern 
reported approximately $235 million in revenue generated directly by its football program.40  
This revenue creates a five to ten million dollar net profit per year.41  In addition to the revenue 
gained from ticket sales and television contracts, Northwestern also profits from selling 
merchandise bearing its Players’ names, numbers, and likenesses.42  
In addition to the direct monetary benefits Northwestern receives, the school also 
capitalizes on indirect benefits attributable to the school’s football program.43  One example, 
known as the “Flutie Effect,” is the correlation between athletic success and increased student 
applications to the university.44  For example, the Players presented evidence that Northwestern 
applications increased by twenty-one percent the academic year following the football season the 
team won the Big Ten Championship title and went to the Rose Bowl.45  The Players also 
showed the Board that after this successful season, media mentions of Northwestern increased by 
one hundred and eighty-five percent, along with alumni donations increasing as well.46 
                                                          
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 12.  
40 Id. 
41 Id. (quoting Petitioner exhibit 5 at 5-6). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 13. 
44 Id. (citing Petitioner exhibit 5 at 7-8); See also Sean Silverthorne, The Flutie Effect: How Athletic Success Boosts 
College Applications, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2013/04/29/the-flutie-effect-
how-athletic-success-boosts-college-applications/#2b200fdc6e96 (last visited Apr. 27, 2017). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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The Players, aiming to be considered employees, additionally pointed to the similarities 
of the business model of a Division I (“D-1”) football program to that of professional teams in 
the National Football League (“NFL”).47  Essentially, the Players presented the fact that both 
types of programs are “in the business of providing sports entertainment through the labor 
provided by players, and in both cases the business derives substantial revenue from that labor 
through ticket sales, television contracts, merchandise, stadium rights, and other sources.”48  The 
Players also posited that, except for the compensation limitation placed upon them by the 
NCAA, the economic relationship between the Players and Northwestern closely resembles the 
economic relationship between a professional player and his NFL team.49 
C. The Players’ Compensation 
As compensation for their services to Northwestern’s football team, the Players receive 
what is called “athletic aid.”50  This aid consists of up to one hundred percent of the “full-ride 
equivalency of $61,063, and covers tuition, room and board, books, and other fees.”51  Most 
athletes do not receive a “full-ride”, but in 2013-14, Northwestern granted athletic aid to one 
hundred and sixty-nine individuals, eighty-eight of them being football players.52  This aid is 
provided to Players explicitly in return for their services to the football team, and can be 
“immediately reduced or canceled” if a player becomes ineligible, voluntarily withdraws, or 
violates team rules as determined by the coaching staff or the athletic administration.53  These 
                                                          
47 Id. at 13.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 14. 
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
 DePaul J. of Sports Law, Volume 13 Issue 1 69 
scholarships are different from non-athletic scholarships in that the latter are provided based on 
financial need rather than qualification and require no services from those receiving them.54   
D. The Players’ and CAPA’s Argument 
Based on the factors laid out above, the Northwestern Players and CAPA (the 
“Petitioners”) contended that the Players were statutory employees based on “the common law of 
agency.”55  According to the law of agency, as discussed in NLRB v. Town & Country, Inc., an 
“employee” is “any person who works for another in return for other compensation.”56 This 
previous NLRB decision stated that, “in the past, when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ 
without defining it, [the Supreme Court has] concluded that Congress intended to describe the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law principles.”57  The 
Petitioners contended that the Players perform services under the University’s control, similar to 
what a player employed by an NFL team performs.58   
First, the Petitioners claimed that the Players provided services that were as extensive as 
a full-time job separate from and in addition to the responsibilities of other students.59  Second, 
the Petitioners claimed that it is indisputable that the Players’ services were performed for the 
University, considering the millions of dollars in revenue attributable solely to the football 
program.60  Lastly, the Petitioners contended that the services they provided were completed in 
return for payment.61  They pointed to the fact that only “a rudimentary economic relationship” is 
required between employee and employer.62  Petitioners also pointed out that the Board 
                                                          
54 Id. at 15-16 
55 Id. at 16 
56 Id. (quoting Town & Country, 516 U.S. at 90.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 17. 
59 Id. at 18.  
60 Id. at 20-21. 
61 Id. at 21. 
62 Id. (quoting WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 NLRB 1273, 1274 (1998)).  
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recognized in-kind benefits as compensation just like wages, and by doing so, contended that the 
benefits (such as tuition payments and room and board) constituted compensation.63   
E. The Regional NLRB’s Decision 
After considering Petitioner’s arguments set forth above, the Regional Board determined 
that “the extensive and undisputed record shows that Northwestern scholarship football players 
are ‘employees’ within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the NLRA, that CAPA is a labor 
organization with [sic] the meaning of Section 2(5), and that CAPA’s petitioned for unit of 
scholarship football players is appropriate.”64 
III. The Higher NLRB’s Review 
After the Regional Board, located in Chicago, found that the Northwestern grant-in-aid 
scholarship football players were considered employees, Northwestern University requested the 
Higher NLRB to review the Regional Board’s decision.65  The Board noted that even when it has 
the statutory authority to act, it has the power to properly decline to do so if it concludes that 
asserting jurisdiction over a particular case would not effectuate the purposes of the National 
Labor Relations Act.66  The Board continued by stating that it has “never been asked to assert 
jurisdiction over any type of college athlete, and the scholarship football players do not fit neatly 
into any analytical framework that the Board has used in cases involving other types of students 
or athletes,” and therefore must determine whether they should exercise its discretion to decline 
jurisdiction.67   
After an evaluation of the facts, the Board decided to decline jurisdiction due to two main 
factors: (1) A decision rendered by them regarding one team would promote instability for the 
                                                          
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 34.  
65 Northwestern University, 362 NLRB No. 167 at 1 (2015). 
66 Id. at 3.  
67 Id. at 3-4. 
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NCAA and conferences in controlling each team; and (2) The fact that the FBS consists mostly 
of public institutions suggests that a Board decision regarding this one school would promote 
instability.68   
A. The Nature of League Sports and the NCAA’s Oversight Renders Individual 
Team Bargaining Problematic69 
The Board noted that the NCAA exists to, among other things, set common rules and 
standards governing their competitions, and exerts a substantial amount of control over the 
operations of individual teams, including areas in which the Northwestern Players attempt to 
collectively bargain.70  The Board noted that a “symbiotic relationship” exists between the 
various teams, the conferences, and the NCAA.71  As a result, the Board stated, “labor issues 
directly involving only an individual team and its players would also affect the NCAA, the Big 
Ten, and the other member institutions.”72  Consequently, the Board stated, any ruling applied to 
one team would have ramifications for other teams, and that “‘it would be difficult to imagine 
any degree of stability in labor relations’ if we were to assert jurisdiction in this single-team 
case.”73  The Board concluded that such a decision is unprecedented, as all previous Board 
decisions concerning professional sports involved league-wide bargaining units.74   
B. The Structure of the FBS and the Nature of Most Colleges Within It Renders a 
Team Specific Ruling Problematic75 
The Board noted that of all the universities that participate in FBS football, all but 
seventeen are state-run institutions.76  As a result, the Board noted that it could not assert 
                                                          
68 Id. at 5.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 4.  
72 Id. at 5.  
73 Id. (quoting North American Soccer League, 236 NLRB 1317, 1321-22 (1978)). 
74 Id. at 5. 
75 Id. 
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jurisdiction over the vast majority of FBS teams because they are not operated by “employers” 
within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.77  The Board also noted that, specifically, 
Northwestern is the only school in the Big Ten that is a private institution, and that it could not 
assert jurisdiction over any of Northwestern’s primary competitors.78  The Board determined that 
because most FBS schools are state-run institutions, they are subject to state labor laws, which at 
least in a few cases, expressly state by statute that scholarship athletes are not employees.79  
Because this issue creates an “inherent asymmetry” of the labor relations, the Board determined 
that asserting jurisdiction would not promote but would rather hinder stability in labor 
relations.80   
C.  Board’s Note as to its Decision 
Although the Board declined to assert jurisdiction, it stated a few disclaimers in 
accordance with the topic being brought up in the future.81  Namely, the Board noted that its 
decision to decline jurisdiction was purely based on the facts in the specific record before it, and 
“that subsequent changes in the treatment of scholarship players could outweigh the 
considerations that motivate [their] decision . . . .”82  In issuing its conclusion regarding its 
decision to deny jurisdiction, the Board specifically stated that it did not decide whether the 
scholarship players are employees or not under Section 2(3).83  Additionally, the Board stated 
that, “we therefore do not address what the Board’s approach might be to a petition for all FBS 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
76 Id. at 8.  
77 Id. at 5; See Big East Conference, 282 NLRB 335, 340 (1986). 
78 Id. at 5.  
79 Id. at 6; See Ohio Rev. Code § 3345.56; Mich. Comp. Laws § 423.201(1)(e)(iii) (covering Big Ten members Ohio 
State University, University of Michigan, and Michigan State University). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. 
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scholarship football players (or at least those at private colleges and universities).”84  Lastly, as a 
final note, the Board stated that its decision to decline jurisdiction “does not preclude a 
reconsideration of this issue in the future”, and that if “[their] conclusions regarding jurisdiction 
warrant reassessment, the Board may revisit its policy in this area.”85  It is this final section of 
notes that left this topic open for reconsideration, and with the recent case discussed below, 
Columbia, this topic could and might be revisited in the future. 
IV.  The Columbia Decision 
In an August 23, 2016 hearing, the NLRB was faced with the challenge of whether 
students who perform services at a university in connection with their studies are statutory 
employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.86  The case 
was originally filed and heard in 2015, in which the Regional Director applied Brown University 
and dismissed the petition of the graduate workers to be considered employees.87  The Federal 
Board granted review and decided to overrule Brown, claiming that that Board erred as to a 
matter of statutory interpretation.88  In Brown, the Board held that graduate assistants cannot be 
statutory employees because they “are primarily students and have a primarily educational, not 
economic, relationship with their university.”89  In disagreeing with this analysis, the Board in 
Columbia determined that it indeed had the statutory authority to consider student assistants as 
employees, and in fact held that “student assistants who have a common-law employment 
relationship with their university are statutory employees under the Act.”90  The Board then 
                                                          
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Columbia, 364 NLRB No. 90 at 1. 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id. (quoting Brown University, 342 NLRB No. 42 at 487. 
90 Id. at 1-2. 
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applied this general rule to the specific facts laid out by the Columbia petitioners and accordingly 
reversed the Regional Board’s decision.91 
A. The Brown and New York University Decisions 
Before one can examine the Columbia decision, one must look to the precedent and 
previous decisions that came before Columbia.  Chronologically, the NLRB first determined in 
NYU that university graduate assistants were in fact statutory employees.92  Then, four years later 
in Brown, the NLRB overruled NYU and determined that student graduate assistants were not 
statutory employees.93  Hence, the Columbia Board was faced with an issue that has already been 
discussed on multiple occasions and reversed once. 
i. The New York University Decision 
In NYU, the Board examined the statutory language of Section 2(3) and the common law 
agency doctrine of the master-servant relationship.94  This doctrine states that “such a 
‘relationship exists when a servant performs services for another, under the other’s control or 
right of control, and in return for payment.’”95  Examining this doctrine, the NYU Board 
determined that “ample evidence exists to find that graduate assistants plainly and literally fall 
within the meaning of “employee” as defined in Section 2(3).”96  In so ruling, the Board looked 
to the “breadth of the statutory language, the lack of any statutory exclusion for graduate 
assistants, and the undisputed facts establishing that the assistants in that case performed services 
under the control and direction of the university for which they were compensated.”97 
 
                                                          
91 Id. at 2.  
92 See New York University and Int’l Union et al., 332 NLRB 1205 (2000). 
93 See Brown, 342 NLRB No. 42. 
94 Columbia, 364 NLRB at 3; See NYU, 332 NLRB at 1206. 
95 Columbia, 364 NLRB at 3 (quoting NYU, 332 NLRB at 1206). 
96 Id. 
97 Columbia, 364 NLRB at 3. 
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ii. The Brown University Decision 
In 2004, the NLRB reassessed the question of whether graduate students are considered 
employees and, in a highly contested decision, overruled NYU.98  In doing so, the Board in 
Brown invoked what it deemed the “’underlying fundamental premise of the Act,’ i.e. that the 
Act is ‘designed to cover economic relationships.’”99  Additionally, the Brown Board stated that 
it would not exercise jurisdiction “over relationships that are ‘primarily educational.’”100  More 
specifically, the Board stated that a fundamental tenant of the Act and a prerequisite to statutory 
coverage was that the employee-employer relationship must be primarily economic in 
character.101  Lastly, the Board supported the finding of a previous Board decision, which stated 
that “collective bargaining is not particularly well suited to educational decision making and that 
any change in emphasis from quality education to economic concerns will ‘prove detrimental to 
both labor and educational policies.’”102  Being a contested decision, there were numerous 
dissenters, who primarily relied on the fact that “‘collective bargaining by graduate student 
employees’ was ‘increasingly a fact of American university life’ and described the majority’s 
decision as ‘woefully out of touch with contemporary academic reality.’”103 
B. Reversing Brown 
The Columbia Board began its discussion by analyzing how the term “employee” should 
be interpreted in light of Section 2(3) of the Act.104  The Board pointed out that the Supreme 
Court has shown that the “’phrasing of the Act seems to reiterate the breadth of the ordinary 
dictionary definition of the term’, a definition that ‘includes any “person who works for another 
                                                          
98 Id.; See also Brown, 342 NLRB No. 42. 
99 Id. (quoting Brown, 342 NLRB at 483,488). 
100 Id. (quoting Brown, 342 NLRB at 488). 
101 Id. at 3 (emphasis in original); See also Brown, 342 NLRB No. 42). 
102 Id. at 3 (citing St. Clare’s Hospital, 229 NLRB 1000, 1002 (1977)). 
103 Id. at 4 (citing Brown, 342 NLRB at 493 (Liebman and Walsh, dissenting). 
104 See 29 U.S.C.§ 152(3). 
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in return for financial or other compensation.”’”105  The Board did note that the Act does not 
directly define the term “employee,” nor addresses students or university employees of any 
sort.106  However, the Board noted that the legislative history of the Act, paired with the design 
of the Act itself, prove that the Brown Board erred.107 
The Columbia Board, looking at the “underlying fundamental purpose of the Act,” 
rejected the Brown Board claim that considering student assistants statutory employees cannot 
with reconciled with the Act.108  Rather, the Board claimed that “[t]he Act is designed to cover a 
particular type of ‘economic relationship’—an employment relationship—and where that 
relationship exists, there should be compelling reasons before the Board excludes a category of 
workers from the Act’s coverage.”109  This compelling reason, according to the Board, did not 
exist regarding the exclusion of student employees.110  The Board continued, stating that the 
Brown Board’s main mistake was “fram[ing] the issue of statutory coverage not in terms of the 
existence of an employment relationship, but rather on whether some other relationship between 
the employee and the employer is the primary one—a standard neither derived from the statutory 
text of Section 2(3) nor from the fundamental policy of the Act.”111  The Columbia Board stated 
that this “primary vs. secondary” education employment relationship is irrelevant, and unless 
considering student assistants employees violates public policy, coverage should in fact extend to 
them.112    
                                                          
105 Columbia, 364 NLRB at 4 (quoting NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995) (quoting 
American Heritage Dictionary 604 (3d ed. 1992)) (emphasis added). 
106 Columbia, 364 NLRB at 5-6. 
107 Id. at 6. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 6-7. 
111 Id. at 7.  
112 Id.  
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In examining public policy in regards to this decision, the Columbia Board concluded 
that “affording student assistants the right to engage in collective bargaining will further the 
policies of the Act, without endangering any cognizable, countervailing harm to private higher 
education.”113  Accordingly, the Board overruled Brown and held that, generally, student 
assistants who have a common-law employment relationship with their respective university are 
considered statutory employees entitled to the protections of the Act.114 
C. Application of this Rule to the Columbia Facts 
The Board applied this new standard to the facts presented to it and concluded:  
(1) that all of the petitioned-for student-assistant classifications consist of 
statutory employees; (2) that the petitioned-for bargaining unit (comprising 
graduate students, terminal Master’s degree students, and undergraduate students) 
is an appropriate unit; and (3) that none of the petitioned-for classifications 
consists of temporary employees who must be excluded from the unit by virtue of 
the limited length of their employment.115   
 
i. Facts of the Case 
Columbia University is a nonprofit educational institution located in New York City.116 
Graduate students at Columbia are selected by the faculty of the academic departments on the 
basis of academic prowess, based on educational background and standardized test scores.117  In 
general, PhD. students spend five to nine years of study within their discipline, during which 
they take courses, prepare a doctoral thesis, and are usually required to teach as well to obtain 
their degree.118  Columbia fully funds most PhD student assistants, typically through tuition and 
a stipend.119  Usually, taking on teaching or research duties is a condition for such funding.120   
                                                          
113 Id. at 14. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 13. 
117 Id. at 15. 
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 14.  
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The nature of teaching duties for a teacher’s assistant varies.121  Columbia’s Teaching 
Assistants (“TA’s”), known as Instructional Officers, fall into various subsidiary categories such 
as undergraduate assistant, master’s degree assistant, and PhD. assistant, all of which involve 
varying levels of discretion and involvement in course design.122  Instructional Officers generally 
work up to twenty hours per week, and typically participate for one to two semesters at a time.123  
Duties include grading papers, holding office hours, leading discussions or laboratory sessions, 
or even assuming one hundred percent of the teaching duties for a given course.124   
Graduate and Departmental Research Assistants, on the other hand, are graduate students 
that generally participate in research rather than teaching.125  Their research is either funded by 
outside grants or by the university itself.126  Both types of Assistants carry out research that will 
ultimately be presented as part of a thesis.127  “Teaching and research occur with the guidance of 
a faculty member or under the direction of an academic department.”128 
ii. Instructional Officers 
The Board noted that “common-law employment . . . generally requires that the employer 
have the right to control the employee’s work, and that the work be performed in exchange for 
compensation.”129  This, the Board claimed, is present in regard to Instructional Officers.130  To 
start, the University directs and oversees the student’s teaching activities, and if they are not 
performed correctly, the students are subject to corrective counseling or removal.131  
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Additionally, Instructional Officers receive compensation for the services provided, namely 
tuition assistance and a cash stipend.132  The Board contended that, “while overlooked by the 
Brown University Board, there is undoubtedly a significant economic component to the 
relationship between universities, like Columbia, and their student assistants.”133  Based on these 
factors, the Columbia Board found “no difficulty” in finding that all of the petitioned-for 
Instructional Officers comprise statutory employees. 134 
iii. Student Research Assistants 
Regarding Student Research Assistants, Columbia argued that they have no common-law 
employment relationship with the University, and based their argument on a previous 
determination in Leland Stanford, which claimed that externally funded research assistants were 
not employees.135  In applying the new standard adopted, the Columbia Board found the “core 
elements of the reasoning in Leland Stanford [as] no longer tenable.”136  The Board concluded 
that Leland Stanford relied on the “primary vs. secondary” relationship requirement rather than 
the common-law standard and overruled it along with Brown.137   
Using this new common-law standard rather than the previous standard used in Leland 
Stanford and Brown, the Board determined that because Columbia “exerts the requisite control 
over the research assistant’s work, and specific work is performed as a condition of receiving the 
financial award, a research assistant is properly treated as an employee under the Act.”138   
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V. Application of Columbia to the FBS 
With the recent Columbia ruling, a new criterion has been created for determining 
whether one is an employee or not, and an application of it to the Northwestern challenge is 
inevitable.  Columbia re-established the common-law employment relationship as the relevant 
test in determining whether one is considered an employee.139  On its face, Columbia helps the 
Northwestern Players, allowing them to make progress in one day being considered employees.  
However, when looking deeper and analyzing Columbia in conjunction with the Board’s 
decision to deny jurisdiction, the Players will find themselves paralyzed in the same 
predicament. 
A. The New Standard  
When just looking at the new standard adopted by the Columbia Board, it is hard to 
determine that the Northwestern Players would not be considered employees, as numerous 
similarities exist between the Players and the Instructional Officers/Research Assistants in 
Columbia.140  Since the Northwestern Players, and collegiate athletes at large, form a common-
law employee-employer relationship with their school in which they perform a service under the 
control of the University in exchange for compensation, it can be predicted that based on this 
test, they are considered statutory employees.141 
 To start, like the petitioners in Columbia, the Players also receive compensation in 
exchange for providing services to the University.142  Similar to the service of assisting in the 
process of teaching or researching, playing football for the school and against other schools can 
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be considered a service, as it also requires sacrifice and hard work.  Also, again similar to the 
petitioners in Columbia, the payment the Players receive is not a traditional form of 
compensation, but rather takes the form of tuition help and a stipend.143  The Columbia Board 
considered this type of compensation acceptable for the Instructional Officers and Research 
Assistants, so it can therefore be predicted that another Board would likewise approve of the 
Players’ compensation.144  
 Next, analogous to the petitioners in Columbia, the Players provide their services under 
the direction of the University and are subject to removal if they do not comply with the 
standards set by the school.145  Both sets of petitioners have responsibilities that restrict them 
from simply pursuing their educational goals at their own discretion, and must adhere to the 
discretion of their university-funded superiors.146  This similarity shows that the Players also 
have their respective services controlled by their “employer,” the University.  
 Lastly, the services provided by the Players produce many benefits for the school, just 
like that of the petitioners in Columbia.147  The benefits created by the Instructional Officers and 
Research Assistants included both the instruction of the undergraduate students of the school, 
which the Columbia Board considered a “salient economic character,” as well as the direct 
economic benefit of the increase of research grants brought in by Research Assistants.148  
Similarly, Division I football players bring in substantial amounts of revenue for their respective 
schools, even to a much larger extent than the petitioners in Columbia.149  If something as salient 
                                                          
143 Id. at 14-16, 21-24. 
144 Columbia, 364 NLRB No. 90 at 17-21. 
145 Post-Hearing Brief of Petitioner College Athletes Players Association, 2014 WL 1922054 at 17-20. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 12-14, 19-22; See also Columbia, 364 NLRB No. 90 at 18-19, 20-21. 
148 Columbia, 364 NLRB No. 90 at 18. 
149 Post-Hearing Brief of Petitioner College Athletes Players Association, 2014 WL 1922054 at 12-13; See also 
NCAA Finances, USA Today, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
 DePaul J. of Sports Law, Volume 13 Issue 1 82 
as educating undergraduate students can qualify as an economic benefit to a school, then the 
millions of dollars produced by collegiate athletes surely will qualify.  
B. The Still-Existing Problem 
Because of the similarities discussed above, it seems that the Columbia decision can 
bridge the gap between collegiate football players and the prospect of being considered 
employees.  However, a major problem still exists: before the NLRB can rule whether they are 
considered employees or not, they must assert jurisdiction and review the case in the first 
place.150  Although the Columbia decision proves to be a prediction that football players will be 
deemed employees, the fact remains that the NLRB can still only assert jurisdiction over a small 
minority of Division I schools, therefore causing instability in the event of a NLRB ruling.151  
This instability idea, which was the main reason the NLRB declined jurisdiction for the 
Northwestern players, has not been minimized by the Columbia decision.152  
C. Moving Forward 
Despite not solving the major problem of instability creating a basis to decline 
jurisdiction, the Columbia decision did affect the criteria of when one is considered an employee 
in the University realm.153  Therefore, it can be predicted that this issue will resurface again.  
Instead of having the problem of jurisdiction in addition to the problem of whether student 
athletes are employees, Columbia has resolved the latter, leaving only the former standing in the 
way of collegiate athletes becoming employees.  This all but guarantees that this topic will be 
once again considered in the future, with both teams and players’ associations attempting to 
bypass this jurisdiction issue.   
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Because the overwhelming majority of Division I football programs are located at public 
universities, the next step forward may have to begin with actions taking place at the state level 
rather than the national level.154  Since most universities in the Big Ten and other Power 5 
conferences are indeed public, the possibility of student-athletes unionizing at those universities 
rests upon the decision of the states in which those schools are located.155  Some states have 
statutes that explicitly state that student-athletes are not employees.156  Student-athletes in such 
states attempting to unionize may have the most difficulty in doing so.   
However, other states take a more lenient stance, while others have not taken a position at 
all.157  In his article, College Athletes as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, Steven Willborn 
discusses this idea, most notably the fact that Florida offered a ruling parallel to the reasoning of 
Columbia before such decision was even decided.158  Willborn also discusses the state of 
California and how it has a public-sector collective bargaining law that would grant student-
athletes explicit protection as employees, as long as “the services they provide are unrelated to 
their educational objectives, or that those educational objectives are subordinate to the services 
they perform.”159  Therefore, public university student-athletes in both Florida and California 
stand in the same position as the Northwestern players discussed here.   
Based on the previous decision, it is likely that they are considered employees, yet a lack 
of continuity hinders an official decision in so ruling.  Having Florida and California on the side 
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of unionization will certainly help the Players’ cause, as those two states together have a 
combined fourteen Division I football programs.160  Hypothetically speaking, if those two states, 
along with the NLRB who has jurisdiction over private universities, were to approve student-
athletes as employees, there would be a total of twenty-eight schools under the jurisdiction of 
that decision.161  This may seem like a good amount, but in comparison to the total of one 
hundred and twenty-eight Division I football schools, one hundred schools would be without 
jurisdiction.162  This large number of schools outside of such jurisdiction would likely still keep 
this hypothetical decision from happening in the first place.  If a mass movement of the decision 
to unionize collegiate athletes were to take place, however, other states would have to sign on.   
In his article, Willborn discusses the fact that thirty-four states have not issued a decision 
or statute showing an opinion with regard to this issue.163  This vast number of states that are 
essentially undecided shows some promise for a possible collegiate athlete unionization 
movement.  In fact, Nicholas Fram and T. Ward Frampton noted in their article about student-
athlete unionization that twelve states, in addition to Florida and California, have issued rulings 
that “support the contention that student-athletes would also qualify as statutory ‘employees.’”164  
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Additionally, Fram and Frampton also discuss that only thirteen states specifically do not extend 
collective bargaining rights to any public employee.165  Because of this specific restriction, it is 
extremely unlikely that student-athletes in those states will be afforded the ability to unionize 
without a statutory change.  Despite this, because a number of the other thirty-seven states 
support employee-determining tests that collegiate athletes can pass, a majority of states 
supporting student-athlete-employees is definitely possible in the future. 
However, despite this positive outlook, almost all of these thirty-seven states still have 
not explicitly ruled on the subject.166  Although the door is open for such a ruling to occur, and 
that such a ruling would likely be favorable to student-athletes in those states, until an actual 
ruling happens, this analysis is merely speculation.  Alone, a tendency to rule a certain way will 
not be sufficient for the NLRB to issue jurisdiction or allow for student-athletes to be protected 
at the state level.  What these above mentioned states do in response to this issue receiving 
national attention should be monitored closely, as a few states ruling that student-athletes are 
employees may be the push needed to get the wheels turning in order to overcome the dubious 
inconsistency problem.   
So, moving forward, what is likely to occur?  From a realistic standpoint, it is very 
unlikely that student-athletes will be fully considered employees.  Although they can satisfy the 
common-law economic employer-employee relationship articulated in Columbia, the Players, 
along with other student-athletes nationwide, will be unlikely to achieve employee status because 
of the lack of support this movement will receive.  
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Based on its ruling to reserve the ability to re-try and possibly reconsider its decision, the 
NLRB seems to be intrigued by this movement, but is paralyzed due to its short reach.167  
Therefore, for anything to really be changed, the classification of a student-athlete-employee 
must be commenced by either the NCAA or the respective states.  It is very unlikely that the 
NCAA endorses such classification, as they would stand to lose much power if such a ruling 
were to occur.  If collegiate athletes were considered employees and could collectively bargain, 
they could request higher compensation, better safety accommodations, better living 
accommodations, and much more.168  In response, the NCAA would have to hear and probably 
accommodate such requests, as the athletes would have much stronger footing and would even 
have the ability to go on strike, therefore harming the NCAA monetarily.  Because such a ruling 
would only weaken the NCAA’s power and strengthen the power of the athletes, it is almost 
certain that the NCAA would not support such a movement.  For the same reasons as the NCAA, 
each individual school would likely oppose such movement as well.  
This leaves the states.  Hypothetically, if numerous states ruled student-athletes as 
employees to the point that a majority of Division I football programs consisted of so-considered 
employees, the NLRB could then have a valid basis for re-assessing its decision in Northwestern.  
If that were to occur, the Board would likely lean on its reasoning in Columbia and therefore 
would almost certainly analogize collegiate athletes to TA’s.  
 Northwestern and Columbia have created a situation that can be fittingly described by a 
routine football play.  Consider a typical game of football, eleven men on offense versus eleven 
men on defense.  Collegiate athletes nationwide are represented by the running back in this 
situation, with the end zone appropriately representing the ruling that classifies student-athletes 
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as employees.  The play is a typical hand-off to the running back around mid-field, since it is the 
responsibility of such athletes to prove that they are employees.  Scoring a touchdown on a 
running play from midfield is unlikely, but not impossible, which reflects the difficulty the 
collegiate athletes face in attempting to unionize.  In this situation, the Northwestern NLRB 
decision to decline jurisdiction is the run-stopping personnel on defense—the defensive line and 
linebackers.  They present the best shot at stopping the running back, and will likely do so before 
the running back reaches the end zone.  However, the running back can be aided by the offensive 
line—the respective states.  If the states pass legislation or rule through the court system that 
student athletes are employees, they might hypothetically create the blocking needed for the 
running back to get through the run stopping defenders and therefore grant the NLRB the 
opportunity to issue jurisdiction.  If this were to occur, all the running back would have to do is 
get past the defensive secondary to reach the end zone.   
In this hypothetical scenario, the secondary is represented by Columbia.  Even though the 
NLRB may issue jurisdiction, the Players must still prove that they are employees in accordance 
with the common law standard laid out in Columbia.  However, if the case gets to that point, the 
Players will likely succeed in so proving.  Therefore, because Columbia will offer little-to-no 
resistance in the Players’ employment efforts, if the Players are able to achieve jurisdiction, they 
will likely be considered employees, much like a running back will likely score if bursting ahead 
into the defensive secondary with a full head of steam.   
The X-factor in this whole situation is the individual states.  Much like how a running 
back will likely not score a touchdown without good blocking, jurisdiction will likely never be 
asserted over this matter without concrete approval by the states first. 
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D. Future Uncertainty 
It is hard to tell what exactly the future holds for collegiate athletes attempting to 
unionize.  However, because of the jurisdiction-based stalemate created by Northwestern, the 
next action likely to occur will be from the states themselves.  If that were to take place and 
NLRB jurisdiction was eventually asserted, Columbia will certainly be a factor, likely aiding the 
student-athletes in achieving employee status. 
However, collegiate athletes being considered employees could have at least one serious 
negative implication.  As of now, scholarships are not considered gross income and are tax-
free.169  But if student athletes are considered employees instead of students, this large amount of 
money given to them may become susceptible to a large tax burden.170  In his comment, Patrick 
Johnston discusses this possibility, stating that if the Northwestern Players claim that they are 
first providing athletic services rather than primarily being students, the IRS could very well 
determine that the scholarships given to the athletes are not aid for school but for these services 
performed, and are therefore taxable income.171  If this determination were to occur, a player 
receiving a typical scholarship would have to pay over $15,000 per year in state and federal 
taxes.172   
This additional financial burden is not the only issue this tax situation creates, either.  
Johnston discusses how this issue may also cause a competitive imbalance based on state income 
taxes.173  Since all states are free to choose the amount of income tax they charge, players being 
taxed on their scholarships would be more likely to attend universities in states with more 
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favorable or no income taxes, thereby consolidating talent into states like Texas and Florida, to 
the detriment of states with high income taxes, like New York and Ohio.174  This imbalance 
could also have a negative impact on revenue streams for schools in these high income tax states, 
thereby causing damage to not only the competitive aspect of Division I football but also to 
individual schools as well.175  
This negative effect of determining collegiate athletes as employees can easily be 
overlooked and should definitely be considered by any team of athletes attempting to be so 
considered, including the football team at Northwestern.  If they learned of this possible 
repercussion, they may in fact reconsider pushing to get NLRB jurisdiction and may be happy 
accepting their scholarship tax-free as it currently is.  Student-athletes around the country should 
consider this and other consequences before attempting to achieve employee status and in fact 
should “be careful what they wish for.”176 
VI. Conclusion 
This article’s purpose was to inform the reader of the challenge brought by the 
Northwestern football team and the NLRB decisions relating to it; to describe the Columbia 
decision; and to relate said decision to the Northwestern challenge and how it can effect that 
cause moving forward.  Unfortunately for the proponents of student-athletes becoming 
employees, Columbia does not assist in overcoming the jurisdiction problem noted by the 
Federal NLRB.  However, if this problem can be circumvented, Columbia provides much 
assistance to these proponents, as that decision re-adopted the common law employer-employee 
relationship as the standard in determining who is an employee.  Under this standard, collegiate 
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athletes can surely pass as employees, just as the teaching and research assistants did in 
Columbia.   
However, this article discussed an easily overlooked but important consequence of 
student-athletes achieving employee status—the fact that their scholarships will likely no longer 
be tax-free.  This consequence, along with any others, should be seriously evaluated before any 
more challenges are made.  Overall, Columbia works to help the proponents of collegiate athlete-
employees, but does not provide a solution for the overarching jurisdictional issue that the NLRB 
noted.  What will occur in the future, if anything significant, is difficult to predict, but any next 
step in the progress of this cause will likely come from individual states.   
